General MacArthur’s Final Address to Congress: 🔗

The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have from the ashes left in war’s wake erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice…. I know of no nation more serene, orderly and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.¹

Go Home Quickly: 🔗

Today, Shigeru Yoshida is regarded as one of Japan’s greatest prime ministers.² He was the dominant figure, at least on the Japanese side, during the Allied occupation of Japan. Yoshida oversaw the beginning of the Korean War, the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco, and Japan’s descent into the Cold War on the side of the capitalist world. In the previously stated article, Jirou Yamaguchi states the reasoning for his continued favorability among educated Japanese:

From the end of the war to 1960, under the confusion of American military occupation, it was the period of rebuilding the various systems in which to lay the foundation for the revitalization of the nation. Shigeru Yoshida, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Kishi Nobusuke were responsible for grappling with the fundamental questions that would decide Japan’s future. In this period, the prime ministers that were desired were those who possessed a kind of vision, somebody who was keenly aware of Japan’s new reality as a minor power, and who could negotiate adroitly with America and other foreign countries.³

The problem is that, for the man who oversaw such a dramatic transition, Mr. Yoshida was deeply skeptical about democracy.⁴ Herein lies the inherent contradiction of the Japanese political system. The Japanese political system was built on a union of the conservative Japanese elites’ realization that to both preserve the emperor, secure Japan from external threats, and beat off the impending communist threat, they would have to come to terms with the Americans. Americans, for their part, came to be more wary of leftist movements springing up in Japan and came to rely heavily on conservative elites.

This was not particularly unique to Japan. Americans had employed former colonial administrators in South Korea as a way of both keeping a functioning bureaucracy in place and as a bulwark against communism. Park Chung Hee, a deeply polarizing figure in Korea, had been a Japanese collaborator. Park had been educated at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy and had been a lieutenant in the army of Manchukuo. His background was actually an important component of the betterment of Japanese-ROK relations during his time as president.⁵ Mr. Yoshida made a particular remark that reveals his real mindset: “There was this idea at the back of my mind that whatever needed to be revised after we regained our independence could be revised then. But once a thing has been decided on, it is not so easy to have it altered.”⁶ In Yoshida Shigeru’s mind, GHK might as well stand for “Go Home Quickly.” This was not an attitude that emerged out of the post-war period. Emperor Hirohito, in his “Jewel Voice Broadcast,” had framed the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration as necessary not only for the survival of the nation but of the entire world. Hirohiro stated that Japan need “have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.”⁷ Such was their resolve.

Leftist Agitation: 🔗

It is important to remember that leftism has broadly two strains that we can classify as the old-left and the new-left. The Americans had unwittingly created the perfect breeding grounds for Japanese leftists. The old-left believes that violence is a valid means towards the creation of a dictatorship of the people. The only peace that can be had is when this is achieved. Unfortunately for them, the middle class never quite revolted like they expected, so they were forced to retreat to political correctness. Political correctness employs the same tactics as the old-leftists, but carries it out in the cultural sphere. In the developed world, there were three countries where the leftists were so bold as to take up arms: Italy, Germany, and Japan. The movements which emerged out of the post-war were very much militant, very much had a broad support base, and very much had little interest in parliamentarianism. In the spring of 1946, Yoshida described his assuming of power among “a sea of red flags.”⁸

Among the reforms pursued by the Americans, they liberalized Japanese society in a way that oversaw the release of political prisoners, legalization of the Communist Party, introduction of pro-labor laws, looser censorship, and a right to organize. The Communists, let free, spread their tentacles into every facet of labor. In 1945 the unions claimed 380,000 members. At the end of 1946, this number was 5.6 million. During its peak in mid-1948, the number of workers unionized was said to be 6.7 million. In perspective, that was more than half of the nonagricultural workforce in Japan at the time.⁹ Contributing to this environment was the economic situation. Inflation was rampant, production stagnated, the government proved quite incompetent, and SCAP promoted political freedoms while avoiding economic reconstruction. The workers fell right into the arms of the Communists. If this all sounds a bit short-sighted, it is because it was. MacArthur was forced to do an about-face. The military government was then forced to crack down on Red activity and rescind some of the previous freedoms that had been granted. The results were immediate; leftists never forgave this and developed a deep anti-Americanism.

The decision which would come to define Japanese politics was the debate on what terms Japan should make peace with the world. Broadly, there were two camps: those who believed in a comprehensive peace (全面講和) and those who believed in a multilateral peace (多数講和, literally “majority peace”). The key difference here is that a comprehensive peace would have to be accepted by all nations. A multilateral peace would be a peace that was accepted by most countries. As we shall see, this is a more important distinction than one might assume. It is also important to keep in mind that the Communists’ greatest asset was not their success in the general elections. In the April 1946 elections, the Communist Party had only managed to get five of their members into the Diet. It was their ability to organize labor and mass protests. Conservatives had the edge at the ballot box because they had inherited the rhetorical skills and a political base that was already established. Leftists were still struggling to build up this kind of base.¹⁰ Japanese politics could have taken a very different turn if it had not been for the outbreak of a war on the peninsula that Japanese were all too familiar with.

Korean War as Shock to the System: 🔗

That war was the Korean War. The Korean War was fought between June 25th, 1950, and July 27th, 1953. The American Occupation lasted between 1945 and 1952. What you can notice immediately about this date is that it was in the middle of the Korean War. The Korean War exposed something about leftist ideology that would not have been made absolutely clear for everyone just on intellectual debate alone. The swelling tide of the old-left in Japan followed traditional Marxist dogma. They believed that the capitalist world necessarily meant the war-like force in the world. Conversely, socialist countries were peaceable. The invasion of South Korea put this theory to the test and showed it to be false. Even though this is common knowledge today, this fact was almost totally denied in Japan for a long time by leftist forces.¹¹ This led to a great shift in Japan. Up until that point, leftist narratives had dominated, and a comprehensive peace had been the desired route. After the Korean War, support shifted to a multilateral peace, which would change Japan’s trajectory for decades to come.

On August 19th, 1950, the Japanese Foreign Ministry put out a pamphlet called ‘The Korean Disturbance and our Position’ (朝鮮の動乱とわれらの立場). In this pamphlet, the road in which Japan was going to choose was elucidated. The pamphlet makes a kind of shocking statement and shows the fears the largely conservative elite were concerned about. It claims that the world had been desiring peace after World War II. It claims that this peace had been betrayed by the Communist world. Therefore, the world had been split up into two: the Capitalist world and the Communist world. The Communist world was fundamentally antagonistic to peace and freedom. The fear was revealed in a line that says, “Even in Western Europe, American economic assistance is intentionally being disturbed. In our country as well, for a time it was believed that lawlessness would take over the public.”¹² The Japanese government had a real fear that Japan would fall to Communism. This was not a preposterous postulation. East Asia was a hair’s breadth from the entire region falling to the reds. At the time when this was published, the People’s Republic of China had established itself distinctly from the Soviets, and the army led by Syngman Rhee was on the brink of collapse. In Japan, communist forces were making great inroads among the public. That is why it is no surprise that it is carried on that: “The war in Korea is not just a fight for democracy in Korea, but it is a fight to protect democracy in Japan as well.”¹³

The Cynical Gamble: 🔗

While these following comments may seem elementary to Japanese political ears, they are important to keep in mind when we try to understand their maneuvering. One, Japan is an archipelago. Two, Japan never fully integrated itself into the continental (Chinese) system. Three, historically, the emperor and the state claimed legitimacy from domestic sources and not from a superior foreign force. Forth, Japan is an Asian country. Surrounding it are Russia, China, and South Korea. Fifth, Japan is not a small country. Japan is roughly 6% larger than Germany with a population of 55.9 million more people than France. Sixth, the changes that the Meiji Restoration brought to Japanese society and the experience of the Japanese Empire have led some to cynically call the country a 飛び離れた西 (or the detached West). That is not to say they are not Asian or that they are fully Western, but to point out that there is a wedge between Japan and the rest of Asia. This leads to a country that neither sees itself as entirely part of one or the other, but that is quite adept at drawing from both. Seventh, do not underestimate Japan. The actions of this apparently small country have influenced the decline of the Ming, the rise of the Qing, the establishment of the PRC, the victors in the Korean War, and the establishment of a new cultural sphere of East Asia. That is not to say that Japan is this all-powerful country, but that Japan should not be discounted as a political player in Asian politics and geopolitics broadly.

The second misconception is a narrative that is floated by both ends of the political spectrum. This is the narrative of a passive Japan that was acted upon. This is weaponized to make Japan out as a victim after the Pacific War, to use as a bludgeon against America. This is used by nationalists to say that Japan was wronged during the Tokyo Trials. This is equally a line used by leftists who claim that Japan was/is being used by a warlike America. As is common for political slogans, the reality is a bit more nuanced. The ending of the Greater East Asia War brought a genuine sense of relief for many. Towards the latter end, the populace was growing quite exhausted from the exertions of the war effort. It was even more welcomed by political enemies of the state who saw it as a potentially new start. A good plurality of the Japanese public either welcomed democratization or accepted it due to the failures of the old system. As historical examples have shown, it is not so easy to democratize countries that are broadly antagonistic to it. Yoshida Shigeru found the changes to Japanese society to be not so easily reversible because Japanese genuinely took to many of the facets of the new constitution.

The Japanese Constitution is a remarkable document. It was a foreign one, but it would come to be ardently defended by many different parties in Japan. It came out of an environment of an assault from both sides. If the Japanese elites had been left to their own devices, they would have hammered out a document that was firmly rightist in tone. The American side was not desiring of a reactionary constitution and wanted to keep the promises which it had made to the Japanese people. On the other hand, what was popular with the people was that they wanted a popular constitution that would be drafted through the involvement of the masses. This was equally unacceptable for the Americans because the Japanese public would likely be swayed by Communist proposals for the constitution. The Meiji Constitution was considered by the American side to be “Prussian tyranny,” so the idea of retaining the old one was not on their minds. In this context, MacArthur made a radical decision to usurp the power of the drafting process and delegated the power to SCAP to create the draft, which would come to be the bedrock upon which the Japanese state would be built. The principles behind it were thrice: a constitutional monarchy, absolute pacifism, and the abolition of feudalism. What is most remarkable is the men and women who drafted the Japanese constitution: a ragtag group that were neither military men nor Japanese experts, a group that possessed little knowledge of the country which they were going to leave their mark on for decades to come. That such a group from such diverse backgrounds would come to draft the constitution that came to be widely accepted, even after the departure of the American military, is practically a miracle.

When SCAP finally decided to put its foot down over the leftist movements bubbling in Japan, the conservative factions inside Japan were in jubilation. Mark Gayn, a journalist for the Toronto Star, noted in his diary that he “could actually recall no American move that matched this pronouncement in its repercussions. There was consternation in union headquarters and in the offices of the left-wing parties. In conservative quarters, there was undisguised jubilation.”¹⁴ On the other hand, when the SCAP draft was presented to the government, they were given an unambiguous threat. Directed to Matsumoto Joji, who was the head of the committee responsible for revising the Meiji constitution, it was directed “that if the cabinet did not act on this matter within forty-eight hours, SCAP would proceed, as promised, to bring its draft directly before the people. This was evidently the excruciating moment when Matsumoto finally realized that, although others might have lost the war, he had just lost the Meiji Constitution.”¹⁵ Emperor Hirohito himself actually agreed quite readily to the draft, which allowed the government to save face.

From these maneuverings, we can see the different forces at play inside Japan. Neither the masses, nor the postwar government, nor the Americans ever were in lockstep with each other, and each faction tried to get something out of the others. That is to say, the Americans used popular movements in Japan as blackmail to get conservatives to accept some of the bitter pills that the Americans wanted to impose on their society. The conservatives, for their part, did not want to see their state determined by mob conceptions of what post-war Japan should look like, so they were forced to accept an alliance with the Americans. The Americans needed the Japanese bureaucrats as well for their civil governance because they did not want to perpetually deal with such matters. The conservatives were equally, if not more so, invested in Japan not falling to socialists, so developing a foreign policy that would prevent such a scenario was never forgotten. Here is where we need to remember exactly what kind of state Japan is and the countries surrounding it. After the loss of its empire, Japan became a middle power. Furthermore, a constitution had been imposed on it that renounced the right to war. But the conservatives were not willing to leave their trust in the surrounding countries of China, North Korea, and Russia. If you believe these to be true, what other choice are you left with? Thus, we come to the cynical gamble of Yoshida Shigeru.

The mistake that people make is that the conservatives needed much convincing on the American side. This is how you end up with such language as “cooperate as much as possible” (できるかぎりの協力).¹⁶ Japan played a large role in the Korean War. The Japanese were not passive observers, but keenly aware of their position and actions. The American ambassador to Japan from May 9th, 1952 to April 28th, 1953, named Robert Murphy, said that:

The Japanese to save us, without any request to supply soldiers, without even permission for it, had dispatched ship and railroad specialists. Themselves and their own skilled underlings went to Korea along with America and worked under the command of the United Nations headquarters. This was top secret. But, if the UN army had not had the support of the Japanese specialists who knew Korea well, staying in Korea would have run into many troubles.”¹⁷

The necessity of Japan as a rear base should not be overlooked. If America had not had the cooperation of Japan, it is no exaggeration to say the war could not have likely been fought. The Japanese saw the Korean War as an existential threat to the security of Japan. The Korean War also gave them the room to maneuver and engage in a multi-lateral peace.

What signing a multi-lateral peace meant for Japan was entering the Cold War firmly on the American side. A multi-lateral peace meant that Japan would not have to settle deals with the Communist governments in China or Russia, nor would it have to negotiate with the governments in Korea. This conclusion was welcomed by nationalists because it meant Japan would have to make few concessions. To this day, there is no peace treaty with Russia. The peace treaty with China was conducted with the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China, who were more in a position of desiring Japanese aid than in any position to make demands. During the Korean War, the American and Japanese formed tighter defense bonds out of necessity. Those who had been fighting America years before now found themselves on the American side. The formation of what came to be the Japanese Self-Defense Force was actually an order from the American side to establish the 警察予備隊 or the National Police Reserve (NPR). They were first trained by American advisors who oversaw their training and gave them weapons. From here, the poison pill that Prime Minister Yoshida introduced into Japan was complete.

His legacy is a complicated one because through his actions and direction he made the country’s defense policy and army inherently political. Leftists in Japan saw the San Francisco Treaty as a betrayal. The military assistance and the establishment of the NPR further increased this feeling. The defense treaty with America and the SDF would forever be tainted with the associations of re-militarization and the abandonment of the principles set down in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. A complex web of interests was born. Conservatives wanted a Japan that could rely on itself to drive away threats from neighbors. Americans wanted to prevent the spread of communism in Asia. Liberals wanted to drive out the old guard from government. The Americans created the article that would come to pain them, that the conservatives despised, and that the liberals would cling so ardently on to. In other words, a great big mess of Japanese defense and foreign policy that Japan has not sorted out to this day. What has been enduring for decades is what can probably be best deemed a compromise from all sides. This thorn, though, would come to cause much damage to left-wing parties, even to the parties that had disassociated themselves from the old-left. The creation of a ruling party ideology that is often rendered in Japanese as 親米保守 (pro-American conservatives). Except, implicit in this designation is a whole host of ironies that is certainly not lost on the individuals themselves.

Inherent Contradictions and Failure to Find Footing: 🔗

The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), since its founding in 1955, has ruled Japan for 64 of 70 years counting up to 2025. This is a level of dominance that is not usually found in a healthy democracy (which, by most metrics, we can consider Japan to be). There are many factors that explain this, so we cannot pinpoint it to a single reason, but one of the reasons is that left-wing parties have never come to a good answer on national defense. Nationalists can claim that they want American bases out and to remove Article 9. This is a plausible answer because it is for sure an answer that is coming from a place of concern about the sovereignty of Japan. The so-called pro-American conservatives generally are in favor of keeping the status quo of Article 9 and maintaining a defense partnership with America as the linchpin of Japanese security policy. This is a realistic plan that also placates moderate voters who do not want to see a re-militarization of Japan. This has more or less been the security policy that the LDP has maintained. People can question why American soldiers are there, but it is difficult to question that as long as Article 9 is in the constitution, such an arrangement is necessary. Left-wing parties generally reject both of these positions. They drum up populist-outrage against American troops and claim America to be the greatest danger to world peace. On the other hand, they enthusiastically support Article 9 and are quick to criticize the SDF.

They claim to want a pacifist Japan, but Japan is surrounded by China, North Korea, and Russia. Japan to this day has not signed a peace treaty with Russia. Japan has active land disputes with its neighbors. This might be viable politically if Japan had ever developed relations with China to the extent that Korea did, but this was not the case. Historical antagonism and cultural differences pre-date the postwar era. It was stated earlier in this paper that Japanese did not have to forcefully de-communized. The opposite occurred, where the Japanese leaders would invoke a red scare so often that even the ardently anti-Communist Americans got fed up with it. As such, Japanese have a deep skepticism towards the People’s Republic of China and harbor concern about Chinese intrusions in Japan. This is a sentiment that is shared widely across the majority of the political spectrum. When Japanese were asked whether they felt a sense of closeness to China in a government survey conducted in 2025, only 15.9% answered in the affirmative.¹⁸ When asked whether Japan’s relationship with China was positive or negative, 86.4% answered negative. Needless to say, these are not high numbers. Which then begs the question: if the Japanese public wants some kind of defensive strategy against China, then what do left-wing parties have to offer them? They oppose building up the SDF. They oppose revising Article 9. They either want to greatly scale back military cooperation with America or abolish the relationship entirely. If all you have is words, it makes it a lot easier for political opponents to question your true motives. It is either a position that is pro-China or one that exists in pure ideological purity instead of bearing any semblance to reality. Again, it is not hard for political opponents to attack and difficult for them to give a good answer to.

An example of this played out was the stint between 2009 and 2012, where the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) had come to power, particularly under Prime Minister Hatoyama. During the first call between the DJP government and the United States, Hatoyama had called for a more balanced relationship between Asia and the West in Japanese foreign policy.¹⁹ Hatoyama made a series of decisions that looked like they would derail the relationship between the US and Japan. The public backlash was swift because of his refusal to see that Japanese national pride did not want to see a vulnerable Japan. Equally, on the other hand, most want a peaceful nation. The failure to balance these two sentiments, which exist simultaneously in the minds of the Japanese public, was one of the major failures of his brief tenure as prime minister. Learning from the disaster of Hatoyama, the successive DJP prime ministers under Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko did a bit of course correcting, but the damage had already been done. The LDP along with its coalition partner Komeito would go on to gain a supermajority. Shinzo Abe would come to power again in 2012, becoming one of the longest-serving prime ministers in postwar Japan. The elections of this year and the years following would see a surge rightward in Japanese politics.

This dynamic has played out once again in Japanese politics. Some consider Sanae Takaichi to be a return to 2012. The snap election held on February 8th, 2026 was a referendum on mostly herself and her popularity. The LDP won 316 seats in Japan’s lower house (previously they had held 198). This was the first time since World War II that a political party had won more than two-thirds of the seats. This victory grows ever larger because many of the parties that hold the other seats in the parliament are not left-wing parties, but parties either on the right of the LDP or in the center. For left-wing parties, the result had been nothing short of disastrous. The election was a result not necessarily of a change in popular opinion, but of the ineptitude of the left in Japan to again form a coherent vision for the country. For the election, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) had come together with Komeito to form the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA). Many voters were left in befuddlement about how a former coalition partner with the LDP could come together with the main opposition party to the LDP. With the days leading up to the election, it became clear to those paying attention that this new alliance had not entirely hashed out their political differences.

In particular, over the issue of the relocation of an American military base from a populated urban center to Henoko Bay, Nago. The CDP advocated a position of ceasing the move while Komeito had advocated for the relocation. When the Joint Representative Yoshihiko Noda was asked on this point, he did not have a good answer.²⁰ Takaichi would point out this discrepancy and force Noda to give a public statement; her statement was: “What stance do you take? If there is no determined policy, not just with Japan’s alliance pertaining to America, there will be an inability to even protect Japan’s peace. Please confirm with us.” Noda answered that the common denominator between the parties was that it needed to be decided by taking into account the voices of the residents of Okinawa.²¹ The party leader of the Social Democratic Party jumped in on the dogpile, asking Mr. Noda directly whether the position of the CRA was opposed or in support of the proposed move. Noda claimed that his party’s position was a “prudent position.”²² Several skeptical voices could be heard. Hyakuta Naoki from the Conservative Party of Japan said, “prudent… that means opposed to, right?”²³ Tamaki Yuichiro from the Democratic Party for the People claimed, “because of this, the Japanese-American relationship will not be strengthened.”²⁴ After taking this beating, poor Mr. Noda pleased neither the left-wing constituents who would be inclined to vote for him, nor the moderates desiring a coherent defensive posture, nor the nationalists who saw such indecisiveness as weakness.

The failure of left-wing parties to gain a significant foothold in Japanese politics can not be solely attributed to their lack of vision on defense. But, it has played a significant role in shaping postwar Japan. The “poison pill” that Yoshida Shigeru had introduced into Japanese politics continues to dog the country. The gamble which Shigeru took has paid off in spades for his political party. The division of the move to settle for a multi-lateral peace and the beginning of re-militarization during the Korean War have not gone away. These questions in Japan are still intensely debated. Any party which wants to succeed in Japanese politics needs to grapple with these questions. Any party attempting to be a serious opposition to the LDP needs an alternative coherent vision that is in line with the way Japanese see themselves in the world. The election of 2026 was more of a referendum on the economy than it was about defense, but the election will surely have consequences on the political order in East Asia. Time is marching relentlessly on. The political dynamics that made up the 20th century will inevitably change and give way to new relationships and ways of seeing the world. Who knows, maybe some day soon in a not too distant future Kim Dae-Jung’s comment on having Japan as a potential rear-base becoming a great help for South Korea will blossom.²⁵ In any case, the importance of America navigating these relationships could determine not just the fate of Asia but of the entire world. Whether either side particularly likes it or not, a containment policy or military conflict with China would only be possible with the cooperation of America and various Asian countries. Japan, Korea, or the Philippines could not manage it if left to themselves, but equally so America could not manage such a strategy without the cooperation of Asia.

References 🔗

Cha, Victor D. “Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty.” Korean Studies 20, no. 1 (1996): 123–60. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.1996.0009.

Dower, John W. Embracing defeat. W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. Glosserman, Brad, and Scott Snyder. The Japan-South Korea Identity Crash. New Work: Columbia University Press, 2015.

“The Jewel Voice Broadcast.” Nuclear Museum. Accessed February 25, 2026. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/key-documents/jewel-voice-broadcast/. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. The Korean War in Asia: A hidden history. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.

“Transcript of General Douglas MacArthur’s Address to Congress, April 19, 1951.” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum . Accessed March 17, 2026. https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/transcript-general-douglas-macarthurs-address-congress.

奥原, 慎平. “辺野古移設巡る中道・野田氏の答えは「慎重」福島氏は賛否迫り、百田氏「苦しいねえ」.” 産経新聞:産経ニュース, January 25, 2026. https://www.sankei.com/article/20260125-Z55OPFRZVZD7HHSKSJ2UA5JIMU/?outputType=theme_election2026.

“《戦後 80 年》政治家・官僚・評論家が選ぶ「最高の総理」「最低の総理」ランキング 圧 倒的に評価が高かったのは吉田茂氏、2 位は田中角栄氏.” NEWS ポストセブン, August 8, 2025. https://www.news-postseven.com/archives/20250807_2056816.html?IMG_ENT=.

“外交に関する世論調査(令和 7 年 9 月調査) | 世論調査 | 内閣府.” 内閣府ー世論調査, September 2025. https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/diplomacy_defense/202511/r07/r07-gaiko/.

朝鮮の動乱とわれらの立場 - データベース「世界と日本」. Accessed February 25, 2026. https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPUS/19500819.O1J.html.

朝鮮戦争と日本: Nids 戦史特集. Tōkyō-to Meguro-ku: 防衛省防衛研究所, 2013.

朝鮮戦争と日本・台湾「侵略」工作. PHP 研究所, 2019.